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Appendix A Transformation of a Superadditive and Essential Game
to a Zero-NormalizedGame
We provide an example to show how to transform a superadditive, and essential three-player game
to a 0-normalizedgame with zero characteristic values of all one-player coalitions. Consider the
game (N; v) with [v(?) j v(1); v(2); v(3) j v(12); v(13); v(23) j v(123)] = [0 j 1; 2; 3 j 8; 10; 13 j 15].
We can transform (N; v) to the following strategically equivalent game (N; v0) by subtracting a
suitable constant ci from player is payo¤ and (from the value of any coalition containing player i).
This gives,
v0(?) = 0 v0(12) = v(12)  v(1)  v(2) = 5
v0(1) = v(1)  1 = 0 v0(13) = v(13)  v(1)  v(3) = 6
v0(2) = v(2)  2 = 0 v0(23) = v(23)  v(2)  v(3) = 8
v0(3) = v(3)  3 = 0 v0(123) = v(123)  v(1)  v(2)  v(3) = 9.
Using the analytic formula in Section 2.1, the nucleolus solution for this (empty core) game (N; v0)
is obtained as y0 = (y01; y02; y03) = (
4
3 ;
10
3 ;
13
3 ). The nucleolus solution for the original problem is then
computed as y = (y1; y2; y3) = (43 + 1;
10
3 + 2;
13
3 + 3) = (
7
3 ;
16
3 ;
22
3 ) which satises the collective
rationality condition y1 + y2 + y3 = v(123) = 15.
Appendix B Sequential LP Method for Computing the Nucleolus
Solution
Our brief review presented in Table 1 indicates that, as an early publication on the sequential LP
method, Maschler et al. [11] used the concept of lexicographic centre to develop an LP procedure
involving O(4n) LP minimization problems. This LP approach has been adopted by some textbooks
(e.g., Wang [22]) as a typicalmethod to calculate the nucleolus solution. However, because the LP
method in [11] requires solving a large number of linear problems, later researchers have investigated
methods to nd more e¢ cient LP approach for the calculation of the nucleolus solution.
We see in Table 1 that, immediately after Maschler et al. [11], Behringer [2] reduced the number
of LP problems that are needed to nd the nucleolus. We also nd from Table 1 that, following
Behringer [2], others (i.e., Dragan [3], Sankaran [16], and Solymosi and Raghavan [19]) attempted
to further improve the LP method; but, they didnt nd any method better than Behringer [2].
More specically, in [3] Dragans LP approach may need more than O(2n) linear problems even
though this author claimed that only n   1 linear programs can be used to nd the nucleolus. In
addition, the solution found by the LP approach in [3] is actually the prenucleolus rather than the
nucleolus solution, as discussed by Potters et al. [15].
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Sankaran [16] developed an LP approach which may require the same number of linear problems
as in Behringer [2] but needs more constraints. Solymosi and Raghavans approach in [19] is only
applied to a special type of cooperative games (i.e., assignment games). Potters et al. [15] suggested
an LP approach that may reduce the number of linear problems; but, this approach increases the
size of each linear problem. From Table 1, we also nd that Fromen [5] improved Behringers
algorithm [2] to reduce the number of linear problems without increasing each LP problems size.
Similar to Section 2, we have written Maple worksheets to illustrate the LP method in calculating
the nucleolus solutions for the cooperative games in Examples 1 and 2. Note from our above
discussion that Maschler et al.s method [11] is an early one and has been widely used by relevant
textbooks (e.g., Owen [14] and Wang [22]) to solve numerical examples. Thus, we considered
Maschler et al.s method to develop the Maple worksheet Empty-Simplex-1.mws for the empty-
core case and the Maple worksheet Non-Empty-Simplex-2.mws for the nonempty-core case. These
les can be downloaded from the authorsweb site at http://www.business.mcmaster.ca/OM/
parlar/files/nucleolus/.
Appendix C Proof of Theorem 1
For a three-player empty-core cooperative game in characteristic form, we nd from (1) that ei(x) 
0, for i = 1, 2, 3. However, since the core of the game is empty, at least one of e12(x), e13(x) and
e23(x) must be positive. Otherwise, if e12(x), e13(x) and e23(x) are all equal to or less than zero,
then using (2) we have v(12)  x1 + x2, v(13)  x1 + x3 and v(23)  x2 + x3, which implies that
the core is not empty.
Therefore, the maximal excess must be one of e12(x), e13(x) and e23(x). Accordingly, in order
to minimize the maximal excess to nd the nucleolus solution, we should change the imputation
x = (x1; x2; x3) to minimize the maximum of e12(x), e13(x) and e23(x). If e12(x) is the maximum,
then we reduce the value of x3 and increase the values of x1 and x2; but, this raises the excesses
e13(x) and e23(x). As a result, e12(x) must be equal to the maximum of e13(x) and e23(x). For
example, if e12(x) = e13(x) > e23(x), we can then reduce the values of x3 and x2 but increase the
value of x1, in order to make both e12(x) and e13(x) smaller; but this increases the excess e23(x).
Thus, the process terminates only when e12(x), e13(x) and e23(x) are equal. A similar argument
applies to the case in which e13(x) or e23(x) is the maximum.
In conclusion, after we minimize the maximal excess, the excesses e12(x), e13(x) and e23(x)
must be equal and also, they must be nonnegative, i.e., e12(x) = e13(x) = e23(x)  0. We can then
solve the following equations,8><>:
v(12)  x1   x2 = v(13)  x1   x3,
v(12)  x1   x2 = v(23)  x2   x3,
v(123) = x1 + x2 + x3,
and nd the values of xi, for i = 1, 2, 3. Because the payo¤s of all three players have been chosen
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to minimize the maximal excess, we cannot make any change on the imputation x = (x1; x2; x3)
to reduce the other excesses ei(x) (i = 1, 2, 3). Otherwise, the maximal excess will be increased.
Thus, the nucleolus y = (y1; y2; y3) is found as (4). 
Appendix D Proof of Lemma 1
We show the su¢ ciency and necessity of these conditions.
Su¢ ciency. In this part, if one of ve conditions is satised, then the largest excesses are reduced
to the minimum. We begin by showing the rst su¢ cient condition. Since x1 = x2 = x3 = 13v(123);
v(123)  3v(12), v(123)  3v(13) and v(123)  3v(23), we use (1) and (2) to nd that
e1(x) = e2(x) = e3(x) =  1
3
v(123),
e12(x) = v(12)  v(123) + x3 = v(12)  2
3
v(123)   1
3
v(123),
e13(x) = v(13)  v(123) + x2 = v(13)  2
3
v(123)   1
3
v(123),
e23(x) = v(23)  v(123) + x1 = v(23)  2
3
v(123)   1
3
v(123),
which implies that at least one of the excesses ei(x) (i = 1, 2, 3) is the largest. Next we prove
that the largest excesses arrive to the minimum when x1 = x2 = x3 = v(123)=3, that is, e1(x) =
e2(x) = e3(x). Suppose that e1(x) is the largest excess and e2(x) and e3(x) are both less than
e1(x). In order to decrease e1(x) =  x1, we should increase the value of x1. However, since
x1 + x2 + x3 = v(123), we must reduce the value of x2 and/or the value of x3, thereby increasing
the excess e2(x) =  x2 and/or e3(x) =  x3. This continues until e1(x) = e2(x) = e3(x). When
either e2(x) or e3(x) is the largest, we can obtain the same result. Thus, we can conclude that if
e1(x) = e2(x) = e3(x), v(123)  3v(12), v(123)  3v(13) and v(123)  3v(23), then the largest
excesses arrive to the minimum; thus we reach the rst su¢ cient condition.
We then discuss the second su¢ cient condition. From (5) we have e3(x) = e12(x). Recalling
from (2) that e3(x) =  x3 and e12(x) = v(12)   v(123) + x3, we nd that in order to reduce
the excess e3(x), we should increase the value of x3. However, this increases the value of e12(x).
Therefore, we cannot change the imputation x = (x1; x2; x3) to reduce both e3(x) and e12(x)
simultaneously. Next, we show that e3(x) and e12(x) are two largest excesses; that is, we should
prove that e3(x)  e1(x)  0, e3(x)  e2(x)  0, e3(x)  e13(x)  0 and e3(x)  e23(x)  0.
1. From (1) we nd that e3(x)  e1(x) =  x3 + x1. Using (5) we compute
e3(x)  e1(x) = v(123) + v(12)
2
  x2   v(123)  v(12)
2
= v(12)  x2,
and we nd that e3(x)  e1(x)  0, which results from (6).
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2. From (1) we nd that e3(x)  e2(x) =  x3 + x2. Using (5) we compute
e3(x)  e2(x) = x2   v(123)  v(12)
2
,
and we nd that e3(x)  e2(x)  0 according to (6).
3. From (1) and (2) we nd that e3(x)   e13(x) =  v(13) + v(123)   x3   x2 =  v(13) + x1.
Using (5) we compute
e3(x)  e13(x) =  v(13) + x1 = v(123) + v(12)
2
  v(13)  x2,
and we nd that e3(x)  e13(x)  0 according to (6).
4. From (1) and (2) we also nd that e3(x)  e23(x) =  v(23)+ v(123) x1 x3 =  v(23)+x2.
Using (5) we compute e3(x) e23(x) =  v(23)+x2 and, using (6), we nd that e3(x) e23(x) 
0.
Similarly, we can show the su¢ cient conditions 3 and 4. Next we discuss the last su¢ cient
condition. Using (11) we have e12(x) = e13(x) = e23(x) = [v(12) + v(13) + v(23)   2v(123)]=3.
Next, we show that these three excesses are the largest, i.e., e12(x)  ei(x), i = 1, 2, 3. From
(1) and (2) we nd that e12(x)   e1(x) = v(12)   v(123) + x3 + x1 = v(12)   x2. According
to (11) we have x2 = [v(123) + v(12) + v(23)   2v(13)]=3, and thus compute e12(x)   e1(x) =
[2v(12)+2v(13)  v(123)  v(23)]=3. From (12) we nd that e12(x)  e1(x)  0, or, e12(x)  e1(x).
We can analogously show the e12(x)  e2(x) and e12(x)  e3(x). Hence, we conclude that if the
conditions (11) and (12) are satised, then the largest excesses are reduced to the minimum.
Necessity. In this part, if the largest excesses are reduced to the minimum, then at least one of
ve conditions must be satised. Note that each of the six excesses e1(x), e2(x), e3(x), e12(x),
e13(x) and e23(x) could be largest. Next, assuming that each of these excesses is the largest, we
change the imputation x = (x1; x2; x3) under the constraint x1+x2+x3 = v(123) until it is reduced
to the minimum.
1. If e1(x) is the largest excess, then according to (1) we can increase the value of x1 to re-
duce this excess. However, from (2) we nd that increasing x1 shall raise the excess e23(x).
Furthermore, because x1 + x2 + x3 = v(123), we should decrease x2 and x3, so increasing
e2(x) and e3(x) in (1). Note that the excesses e12(x) and/or e13(x) in (2) decrease when we
decrease x2 and/or x3 to reduce the largest excess e1(x). Thus, the largest excess reaches the
minimum when e1(x) = e23(x) or e1(x) = e2(x) = e3(x).
Consider the case that e1(x) = e23(x) and they are the largest excesses. Using (1) and (2) we
have the equation  x1 = v(23)  v(123) + x1 and solve it to obtain x1 = [v(123)  v(23)]=2.
Since x1 + x2 + x3 = v(123), we reach (9). In addition, since e1(x) is the largest excess, we
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have 8>>>><>>>>:
e1(x)  e2(x)  0,
e1(x)  e3(x)  0,
e1(x)  e12(x)  0,
e1(x)  e13(x)  0,
or
8>>>><>>>>:
 x1 + x2  0,
 x1 + x3  0,
x2  v(12),
x3  v(13),
which is equivalent to (10). Thus, the fourth condition including (9) and (10) corresponds to
this case.
Next, we discuss the case that e1(x) = e2(x) = e3(x) and they are the largest excesses.
According to (1), we nd  x1 =  x2 =  x3 and use x1 + x2 + x3 = v(123) to attain the
imputation x = (x1; x2; x3) = (v(123)=3; v(123)=3; v(123)=3). Because e1(x) is the largest
excess, we have 8><>:
e1(x)  e12(x)  0,
e1(x)  e13(x)  0,
e1(x)  e23(x)  0,
or
8><>:
x2  v(12),
x3  v(13),
x1  v(23).
Replacing xi (for i = 1, 2, 3) with their solutions and simplifying the above inequalities give
v(123)  max(3v(12), 3v(13), 3v(23)). Thus, we reach the rst necessary condition.
2. Similarly, if e2(x) is the largest excess, then it reaches the minimum when e2(x) = e13(x)
or e1(x) = e2(x) = e3(x). We can also analogously show that the third necessary condition
including (7) and (8) corresponds to the case that e2(x) = e13(x).
3. Similarly, if e3(x) is the largest excess, then it arrives to the minimum when e3(x) = e12(x)
or e1(x) = e2(x) = e3(x). We can also show that the second necessary condition including
(5) and (6) corresponds to the case that e3(x) = e12(x).
4. If e12(x) is the largest excess, then according to (2) we can decrease the value of x3 to
reduce this excess. However, from (2) we nd that decreasing x3 shall raise the excess e3(x).
Furthermore, since x1 + x2 + x3 = v(123), we should increase x1 and x2, so increasing e23(x)
and e13(x) in (2). Note that the excesses e1(x) and/or e2(x) in (1) decrease when we increase
x2 and/or x3 to reduce the largest excess e12(x). Thus, the largest excess reaches the minimum
when e12(x) = e3(x) or e12(x) = e13(x) = e23(x).
We have shown that the second necessary condition corresponds to the case that e3(x) =
e12(x). Next we use (2) to solve e12(x) = e13(x) = e23(x), and obtain (11). Since e12(x) is
the largest excess, we have e12(x)   ei(x)  0, for i = 1, 2, 3; and we use (11) to simplify
these three inequalities and reach (12). Hence, the fth necessary condition including (11)
and (12) corresponds to the case that e12(x) = e13(x) = e23(x).
5. Similarly, if e13(x) is the largest excess, then it reaches the minimum when e13(x) = e2(x)
or e12(x) = e13(x) = e23(x); the former corresponds to the third necessary condition and the
latter corresponds to the fth necessary condition.
6. Similarly, if e23(x) is the largest excess, then it reaches the minimum when e23(x) = e1(x) or
e12(x) = e13(x) = e23(x); the former corresponds to the fourth necessary condition and the
latter corresponds to the fth necessary condition.
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This proves the lemma. 
Appendix E Proof of Theorem 2
We can easily nd from Lemma 1 that if v(123)  max(3v(12), 3v(13), 3v(23)), the excesses
ei(x) (for i = 1, 2, 3) are the largest and thus the imputation x = (x1; x2; x3) = (v(123)=3;
v(123)=3; v(123)=3) when the largest excesses are reduced to the minimum. Since we have ob-
tained the values of xi, for i = 1, 2, 3, we cannot decrease any other excess. Hence, we arrive to
Case 1 in Theorem 2.
Next, we consider the situation in which the largest excess is minimized because the second
condition in Lemma 1 is satised. Under the condition, e3(x) = e12(x), x3 = [v(123)  v(12)]2
and the value of x2 is determined under the constraint (6). By using (6), we consider the following
four cases in which we minimize the second largest excesses.
1. If v(123)  v(12) + 2v(23), v(123)  v(12) + 2v(13) and v(123)  3v(12), then f[v(123) +
v(12)]=2   v(13)g  v(12)  [v(123)   v(12)]=2  v(23), and we can reduce (6) to [v(123)  
v(12)]=2  x2  v(12) and we can easily show that
max fv(23); v(13)g  [v(123)  v(12)]=2  v(12). (13)
Next, we choose an appropriate value of x2 to minimize the second largest excesses subject to
[v(123)   v(12)]=2  x2  v(12). Except for the largest excesses e3(x) and e12(x), the other
excesses are computed as
e1(x) =  x1 = x2   v(123) + v(12)
2
, (14)
e2(x) =  x2, (15)
e13(x) = x2   v(123) + v(13),
e23(x) = v(23)  v(123) + x1 = v(23)  v(123)  v(12)
2
  x2:
Using (13) we have e1(x)  e13(x) and e2(x)  e23(x), which implies that e1(x) and/or
e2(x) could be the second largest excess. From (14) and (15) we nd that the second largest
excesses are reduced to the minimum as e1(x) = e2(x), or, x2 = [v(123) + v(12)]=4, which
satises the constraint [v(123)   v(12)]=2  x2  v(12). Since x1 + x2 + x3 = v(123), we
compute x1 = x2 = [v(123) + v(12)]=4. We notice that the other excesses (i.e., e13(x) and
e23(x)) cannot be reduced because the imputation x has been determined; thus, the nucleolus
solution is y1 = y2 = [v(123) + v(12)]=4 and y3 = [v(123)   v(12)]=2, which corresponds to
the second case (with i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j, and k = 3) in Theorem 2.
2. If v(123)  v(12)+2v(23), v(123)  v(12)+2v(13) and v(12)  v(13), then v(12)  f[v(123)+
v(12)]=2 v(13)g  [v(123) v(12)]=2  v(23), and we can reduce (6) to [v(123) v(12)]=2 
x2  f[v(123) + v(12)]=2   v(13)g. Similar to the last case, we can show that under this
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condition the nucleolus solution is computed as y = (y1; y2; y3) = ([v(12)+v(13)]=2; [v(123) 
v(13)]=2; [v(123)   v(12)]=2), which corresponds to the third case (with i = 1, j = 2 and
k = 3) in Theorem 2.
3. If v(123)  v(12) + 2v(23), v(123)  v(12) + 2v(13) and v(12)  v(23), then we nd the
formula of computing nucleolus solution for the third case (with i = 2, j = 1 and k = 3) in
Theorem 2.
4. If v(123)  v(12) + 2v(23), v(123)  v(12) + 2v(13) and v(123) + v(12)  2[v(13) + v(23)],
then we nd the formula of computing nucleolus solution for the fourth case (with i; j = 1; 2
and i 6= j, and k = 3) in Theorem 2.
Similar to our above analysis, we can analyze the third and fourth conditions in Lemma 1, and
reach the corresponding results in Theorem 2.
From Lemma 1 we nd that under the condition (12), the excesses e12(x), e13(x) and e23(x)
are the largest and the triple imputation x is obtained as (11). Thus, we cannot decrease any other
excess. Hence, we arrive to fth case in Theorem 2. 
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